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Article 7

Law School as a Culture of Conversation:
Re-imagining Legal Education as a Process of
Conversion to the Demands of Authentic
Conversation
Gregory A. Kalscheur, S.J.
The hardestjob of the first year is ...to knock your ethics into
temporary anesthesia. Your view of social policy, your sense of
justice-to knock these out of you along with woozy thinking,
along with ideas all fuzzed along their edges. You are to
acquire ability to think precisely, to analyze coldly .... to see,
and see only, and manipulate, the machinery of the law. It is
not easy thus to turn human beings into lawyers.... None the
less, it is an almost impossible process to achieve the technique
without sacrificingsome humanity first.'
Karl Llewellyn once observed that technique without values is
wickedness, but values without technique is foolishness. The aim
is to become an accomplished technician without losing sight2 of
the values of justice and love which the vocation is all about.
I. INTRODUCTION

Conventional wisdom holds that the principal task of a law school is
to teach law students to "think like lawyers." What does this task
entail? Articulated relatively neutrally, this component of a law
school's work emphasizes "training students to define the issues
carefully and to marshal all the arguments and counterarguments on
either side." 3 Attaining this sharpness of mind, however, often is
experienced as coming with a significant cost; it has (not entirely

* Gregory Kalscheur is a Jesuit scholastic currently teaching in the Political Science
Department and working at the Center for Values and Service at Loyola College in
Maryland. B.A., 1985, Georgetown University; J.D., 1988, University of Michigan
Law School.
1. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 116(1991).
2. Christopher F. Mooney, Law: A Vocation to Justice and Love, in THE PROFESSIONS
INETHICAL CONTEXT: VOCATIONS TO JUSTICE AND LOVE 83-84 (Francis A. Eigo ed., 1986).
3. Id. at 76 (quoting Derek Bok, A Flawed System, HARV. MAG., May-June 1983, at

45).
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cynically) been
said that "law makes [one's] mind sharper by
'4
narrowing it.
My pastoral work as a Jesuit scholastic from 1994-96 at the Loyola
University Chicago School of Law, as well as my own experiences as
a law student at the University of Michigan from 1985-88 and -as a
practicing attorney from 1988-92, have taught me that there is some
basis for the fear that legal education and practice can lead to a
disturbing narrowing of mind and perspective. Indeed, I contend that
this short-sighted narrowing of mind is symptomatic of a crisis of
meaning and value5 in the law and legal education. This narrowness
of perspective in the study and practice of the law stems from a
tendency to see the law simply as a set of instrumental rules to be
manipulated, and the lawyer simply as a technician skilled in the
manipulation of those rules. A crisis in meaning and value results
when law students arrive at law school and experience themselves
being formed to play the restricted role of skilled technician, a role,
disconnected from larger questions of human aspiration. Instead of
being introduced to the law as a deeply human activity that itself
involves a search for meaning and value, law students can experience
law school as an alienating trade school. In short, law school can be
experienced as a form of narrow training that diminishes something
central to the human person: the fundamental human drive to question
and to follow those questions wherever they lead.
This Article will explore the ways in which the thought of two
scholars, Bernard Lonergan and White, can usefully inform our
understanding of this crisis of meaning and value within the context of
a conception of the law as a social and cultural activity. More
specifically, this Article will illustrate the manner in which the work of
Bernard Lonergan establishes a framework for fruitful reflection about
the objectives and the process of legal education, and about the
character of the contemporary law school as a community which
fosters the development of a culture of argument and conversation.
4. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's
Missing from the MacCrate Report-Of Skills, Legal Science and Being a Human Being,

69 WASH. L. REV. 593, 600 n.30 (1994).
5.

See DAVID GRANFIELD, THE INNER EXPERIENCE OF LAW: A JURISPRUDENCE OF

SUBJECTIVITY (1988). This notion of a crisis of "meaning and value" was suggested to me
by my reading of Granfield's book. Id. at 1. The purpose of the book is "to examine the
possibility of an inner experience of law." Id. The book is a response to the frustration
and the sense of absurdity that many feel in their quest for an intellectual and ethical
ground for law. Id. at 273-75. The experiences of alienation and disintegration on the
part of law students that I describe in Part II, below, are, I think, components of the
frustration and sense of absurdity that prompt Granfield's search for meaning and value
in the experience of law.
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Such a culture serves as an essential corrective to the narrowness of
perspective that leads to the experience of alienation among law
students. This narrowness of perspective and the crisis of meaning
and value to which it gives rise are manifestations of the breakdown in
the process of common sense knowing that Lonergan characterizes as
"general bias."6
Moreover, drawing on the legal scholarship of J.B. White, this
Article will contend that the law usefully can be understood as a
conversational process of meaning-making that constitutively shapes
the character of the community and of the lawyer. Accordingly, legal
education might best be understood as a process that serves to bring
the law student into this culture of constitutive conversation. In fact,
the law school itself can be imagined as a culture of conversation that
seeks the conversion-or "re-horizoning"7 -of law students. Further,
within this culture of conversation and argument, both the law as an
activity and the law school can be understood as components of
"cosmopolis": the cultural context Lonergan proposes as a vehicle for
the reversal of the long cycle of decline that is the consequence of the
general bias of common sense.'
First, this Article describes the distortions in legal education caused
by the narrowing of mind and perspective that coincides with an
understanding of the role of the lawyer as a technician manipulating the
rules. Then, this Article outlines Lonergan's understanding of the
constitutive function of acts of meaning and White's analogous
understanding of law as a meaning-making activity that is constitutive
of character and community. Next, this Article illustrates that the law
can be understood as a form of what Lonergan calls practical common
sense. As a form of common sense knowing, the law is subject to the
problems associated with general bias. Accordingly, this Article
explores the manner in which the problem of general bias in the law
might be addressed within an understanding of the law-and
especially the law school-as a culture of argument and authentic
conversation that promotes conversion, detachment from bias, and
heightened fidelity to the unrestricted desire to know through a process
of dialectic and "continuous and ever more exacting application of the
6.

BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING

(rev. stud. ed. 1958) [hereinafter LONERGAN, INSIGHT].
7. See Frank P. Braio, Towards the Re-Horizoning of Subjects:

225-42

Re-Structuring

Classical-ModernEducational Perspectives, in 13 METHOD: J. OF LONERGAN STUD. 99-

109 (1995) (reviewing Bernard Lonergan, Topics in Education, in 10 COLLECTED WORKS
OF BERNARD LONERGAN (Robert Doran & Frederick E. Crowe eds., 1993)).
8. See infra Part V.
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transcendental precepts. Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable,
Be responsible." 9 Finally, this Article suggests that the commitments
and traditions of the Society of Jesus give a law school which operates
within the context of a Jesuit university unique motivations and
opportunities to establish an environment that truly is a culture of
authentic conversation that promotes conversion.
In short, the vision of legal education set forth in this Article-my
understanding of the process of teaching the student to "learn to think
like a lawyer"--can be seen as a "re-horizoning": a sort of conversion
to a new horizon that is more and more open to the central demand of
authentic conversation, the demand to give oneself wholly to the
unrestricted desire to know by letting one's questions take over, and
by following those questions wherever they lead.'0
II. THE CRISIS OF MEANING AND VALUE IN LEGAL EDUCATION
While studying philosophy and theology at Loyola University
Chicago from the fall of 1994 through the spring of 1996, I spent a
few hours each week assisting the chaplain at Loyola's Law School.
Through my contact with the students in that pastoral work, I became
aware of their very real hunger for substantive conversation to connect
the narrow, technical, analytical rigor of their academic work with the
larger context of their lives. Given my own experience as a law
student, I know first-hand that the rigor and demands of the law
school curriculum can cause students to feel as though their lives are
being consumed by activities that require a high level of focus and
intensity, but which often seem far removed from the desires and
concerns that led them to law school in the first place and which
continue to lie at the center of who they are as people.
As a result, I hoped through my pastoral presence to facilitate
conversation about significant issues in peoples' lives: issues of life
and faith, God and relationships, things that give us hope and joy,
things we are grateful for, things we find difficult or frustrating.
Through making myself available for conversation, by facilitating
annual Days of Retreat and Recollection, by promoting and
participating in Advent and Lenten Busy Student Retreats, by trying to
get people involved in a book discussion group that would raise issues
of discernment and life choice, and by endeavoring to build more of a
sense of community and legal vocation by coordinating a series of
9. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY
METHOD IN THEOLOGY].
10. See DAVID TRACY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY:

231 (1994) [hereinafter

LONERGAN,

HERMENEUTICS, RELIGION, HOPE 19-

25 (1987). See infra Part V.C for a discussion of this book.
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Sunday liturgies for law students, I wanted to see if law students could
be encouraged to view their lives and their desires to be lawyers as part
of a call from God, rather than seeing the law simply as a job or a role
that was somehow separate from the rest of their lives. I hoped, in
short, to raise questions and facilitate reflection and conversation that
might bring a greater degree of wholeness and perspective to lives I
knew to be frustratingly harried and fragmented.
My limited presence in the law school made it difficult for me to
engage large numbers of students in the sorts of pastoral activities I
had in mind." Still, the sustained and significant contact that I
eventually had with a relatively small but stable group of students
definitely confirmed my belief that there is a very real desire among
law students for an experience of law school which speaks to them as
whole persons; a desire that is frustrated by their experience of law
school and the practice of law as activities which are disconnected
from the rest of their lives. A second-year student clearly articulated
this sort of desire in a letter to the editor of the Law School student
newspaper:
Coming into my first year at Loyola, ... I was hoping that I had
found an environment in which individuals would be involved in
analyzing issues and discussing matters of importance in our
society on a regular basis .... Instead, what I have found is...
an environment in which important issues are either ignored,
hastily dismissed with shallow analysis, or avoided under a veil
of sarcastic humor. . . . Our failures to engage in honest and
open discussions which analyze world issues, community
concerns, and classroom queries create in us myopic thought
patterns that restrict our reasoning ability, and as a

consequence, our ability for legal analysis. In our failure to
open our minds and face important issues with sincerity,
we
2
handicap ourselves in our very purpose for being here.1
Interestingly, M.H. Hoeflich, Dean of Syracuse University's
College of Law, suggests that this myopic narrowing of perspective
and inability to engage in more open-ended questioning is
1 1. During the spring, 1996 semester, Loyola's Law School had a total of 802
students (571 in the day division, 168 in the evening division, and 63 in the Institute of
Health Law) See Spring 1996 Enrollment Report, prepared by Loyola University
Chicago Office of Institutional Research, January 29, 1996. In light of the size of the
institution, the busy schedules of the students (many of whom work in the legal
community during the day), and my own limited time commitment (8-10 hours per
week), I found it difficult to establish myself as a significant pastoral presence in the law
school community.
12. Aneel L. Chablani, 2L Attempts to Promote Discussion, BLACKACRE, Sept. 27,
1995, at 5 (emphasis added).
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characteristicof contemporary American legal education. Dean
Hoeflich asserts that most modern legal education
is competent. It turns out competent young lawyers. It does
not, generally, produce thoughtful, humanistic jurists. It
produces young men and women who solve problems but who
do not pause to ask why problems arise or whether formal legal
processes are the best means of solving all problems. The
modem law school is, in many ways, a citadel, resisting change
and resisting exposing itself to the type of self-examination that
true scholarship and the best teaching demand, for selfexamination requires a broadening
of perspective and a
13
willingness to alter one's goals.

Dean Hoeflich's call for a broadening of perspective is consonant
with aspects of my own experience of legal practice. Before entering
the Society of Jesus, I spent three years as a litigation associate in a
large law firm. I saw that developing and maintaining a broad
perspective in one's approach to the practice of law can be very
difficult. In large-firm practice, an associate is often swiftly directed to
settle in a particular practice area, where it becomes quite easy to see
oneself as a technician working long hours in a very narrow corner of
the law. I observed first-hand the difficulty young attorneys can have
in maintaining a broad and humanly integrated perspective on the law
while being engaged in the sort of large-firm practice that is attractive
to many of the newly minted lawyers emerging from the nation's law
schools.
The narrowness of perspective that Dean Hoeflich observes-the
failure of modern legal education to produce humanistic lawyers who
are open to more broadly based questions about the role of law and the
legal process in society-may be rooted in the fact that contemporary
legal education can inculcate in students the notion that the law is
nothing more than a system of rules and principles to be manipulated
for any given ends. Christopher Mooney, S.J., notes that "[1legal
education ... has been almost exclusively concerned with principles
and logical analysis and generally avoids what appears to be the
quagmire of moral inquiry."' 4 As a result, legal education "inevitably
tend[s] to distort the reality of the' 5world of law by interpreting the legal
process as simply a set of rules."'

13. M.H. Hoeflich, Law, Culture and the University: An Inaugural Discourse, 40
SYRACUSE L. REv. 789, 796 (1989) (emphasis added).
14. Mooney, supra note 2, at 84.
15. Id.
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Law school then becomes an institution whose primary focus is the
development of a high level of analytical rigor and technical
competence with respect to these rules. Technical competence and
analytical rigor are, of course, of great importance and are not
problematic in themselves. The separation of technique from concern
for human values, however, is a problem. The inculcation of a
technical legal rationality that occupies the great bulk of the student's
time and life in law school can cause the ability and desire to ask
6
questions falling outside that model of legal rationality to atrophy.1
As Mooney explains, "[t]he risk is... that the meaning of law will be
reduced to technique, thereby restricting legal education to training in
technique and understanding legal practice as the use of technique to
manipulate human behavior."' 7
This understanding of the law as a set of rules to be manipulated and
law school as the process of attaining mastery in the application of a
set of technical skills stems in large part from the presuppositions
underlying the development of the "case method" of legal study by
Harvard Law School Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell in the
latter part of the nineteenth century. 8 Langdell's dream was to make
the law a respectable discipline within the university setting by
demonstrating that law was best understood as a "science"-a system
of rules that was self-sufficient, that operated with deductive certainty,
and that was not subject to change:' 9
Law, considered as a science, consists of certain principles or
doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to
apply them with constant facility and certainty to the evertangled skein of human affairs, is what constitutes the true
lawyer; and hence to acquire that mastery should be the business
of every earnest student of law .... [M]uch of the shortest and
best, if not the only way of mastering doctrine effectively is by
studying the cases in which it is embodied.20
Langdell's highly formalistic understanding of "legal science" has
not survived the twentieth-century critique launched by the Legal
Realists of the 1930s and '40s and carried on by today's Critical Legal
Studies movement. 1 With their emphasis on exposing the degree to
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

83-84.
83.
71-73.
73.
72 (quoting CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, CASES ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS viii (1879)).
2 1. See, e.g., Anthony Kronman, Jurisprudential Responses to Legal Realism, 73
CORNELL L. REV. 335 (1988); Mark Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An
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which the law allows for a wide range of significant judicial choice in
legal decision making, the Realists and their CLS successors
effectively demolished the Langdellian idea that the law possesses an
internal, almost geometric logic, that compels particular decisions in
particular cases.22
Still, Langdell's conception of the identity of the lawyer as one who
has mastered the technical skills of deploying, manipulating, and
applying legal rules (now understood non-formalistically) in particular
situations of human conduct has, to a great extent, survived.
Moreover, this conception of the identity of the lawyer continues to
permeate the law school experience. For example, Mooney explains
that the largely unacknowledged process of professional socialization
that goes on in legal education can lead law students to assume an
identity that has been shaped
by the ability to analyze, the capacity to be precise, logical, and
objective. Law students are trained not to make statements
which cannot be defended by objective criteria, and so they
develop an ability to elaborate legal arguments unconnected
with personally-held beliefs. Such legal argument becomes, as a
result, an intellectually narrowing process, with the obvious risk
that what is held to be irrelevant to the main argument will
gradually in one's thinking become irrelevant altogether.
Technical analysis that continually excludes human feeling and
concern leads to a sense that these qualities
are somehow
23
antithetical to a thoroughly rational inquiry.
By educating students to perform such a narrowly defined
professional role, law school can limit "the ability [of the law student]
to perceive and appreciate the human concerns and values that underlie
law and lawyering. ' 24 Law students then quite naturally experience
law school as alienating and dehumanizing. This experience of
separation, of a disjunction between their professional training and
their desire that their professional role somehow make sense in their
lives, can accurately be described as a crisis of meaning and value:
Does what I am working toward with great intensity make any sense to
me, and do I experience what I am doing as part of a fulfilling human
life?
Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L. REV. 577, 581-89 (1987).
22. See Mooney, supra note 2, at 72.
23. Id. at 74. See also E. DVORKIN ET AL., BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC
PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM 1 (1981). "We believe that a
subtle process of professionalization occurs during law school without being addressed
or even acknowledged." Id.
24. See id.
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This crisis of meaning and value in the law is described by legal
scholar David Granfield in terms of this question: Can members of the
legal profession "afford to practice law as a fascinating technique for
earning a living, if it remains separate from what they believe are the
most vital and fundamental concerns of life? ' '2 5 Granfield concludes

his study of the contemporary crisis-a crisis stemming from lawyers'
inability to integrate law into the whole of their lives-by explaining
that
U]udges, lawyers, professors, and even law students develop a
characteristic mentality. Law transforms them for better or
worse. If it remains merely a job, a prestigious way of making a
living, a sophisticated, dialectical skill, or a springboard to a
position of power and influence, it splits their life into
uncoordinated personal and professional compartments. The
result is that one may become worldly wise without being truly
wise; for true wisdom keeps asking relevant questions and keeps
trying to verify
26 and unify insights and to integrate all of life's
experiences.

Yale Law School Dean Anthony Kronman sees a similarly grave
crisis in the contemporary American legal profession. Dean Kronman
points to a "spiritual crisis" rooted in a growing doubt on the part of
lawyers that, in spite of increasing material well-being, the practice of
law can play a significant role in their fulfillment as human beings.
Like Granfield, Dean Kronman locates the source of this crisis in a
restrictive overemphasis on the role of the lawyer as technician:
This crisis has been brought about by the demise of an older set
of values ....At the very center of these values was the belief

that the outstanding lawyer-the one who serves as a model for
the rest-is not simply an accomplished technician but a person
of prudence or practical wisdom as well. .

.

. [E]arlier

generations of American lawyers conceived their highest goal to
be the attainment of a wisdom that lies beyond technique-a
wisdom about human beings and their tangled affairs that
anyone who wishes to provide real deliberative counsel must
possess .... To those who shared this view it seemed obvious

that a lawyer's life could be deeply fulfilling. For the charactervirtue of practical wisdom is a central human excellence that has
an intrinsic value of its own. 28
25. GRANFIELD, supra note 5,at 7.
26. Id. at 274.
27. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 2 (1993).

28. Id. at 2-3.

342

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 28

The emphasis on technical mastery and analytic rigor that
characterizes the contemporary law school, of course, should not be
discarded. Still, the separation of technical skill from human
aspirations and values-its disjunction from the fundamentally human
search for purpose and meaning in life-narrows the vision of the law
student in a way experienced as humanly diminished. Moreover,
education that generates this myopia promotes an impoverished
understanding of the law, the legal process, and what it is to be a
lawyer. Such an impoverished understanding of the law makes it
more difficult for us to see the law as something we create, as an
activity that constitutes us and our communities, and as a process of
questioning through which we can criticize the law and seek to move
the communities it constitutes in new directions.
In order to avert this crisis, "[w]hat is needed is a way of bringing
together mastery with aspiration, intellect with experience, rigor with
value, pragmatism with idealism, competence and skill with caring and
a sense of meaning. ,2 9 The work of Bernard Lonergan and White
allows us to bridge these dichotomies in a way that can ground a rehumanized vision of the law and of legal education by helping us to
understand the law as an activity of "common sense knowing" that
unfolds within the context of a "culture of argument, ' 30 and by leading
us to acknowledge the narrowness of vision I describe as a destructive
form of "general bias."'"
III. LAW AS A MEANING-MAKING ACTIVITY
CONSTITUTIVE OF CHARACTER AND COMMUNITY

The potential for a fruitful exploration of the law in a Lonerganian
framework is evident in the relationship between Lonergan's
discussion of the constitutive function of acts of meaning and White's
understanding of the law as a form of "constitutive rhetoric. 32
Lonergan contends that human reality-the real world in which we
live-is "in large measure constituted through acts of meaning. 33 The
world of immediacy, that which is experienced simply through sense
and consciousness, is tiny. 34 Thus, the real world is one we encounter
29. DVORKIN, supra note 23, at 3.
30. See infra Part V.

3 1. See infra Part IV.
32. See JAMES BOYD WHITE,

HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF

THE LAW 28 (1985) [hereinafter WHITE, HERACLES' Bow].

33. Bernard Lonergan, Dimensions of Meaning, in COLLECTION 252 (F.E. Crowe, S.J.
ed., 1967) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Lonergan, Dimensions of Meaning].
34. Id.
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only through the mediation of meaning; indeed, it is a world that is
constructed by means of acts of meaning.35 "Beyond the world we
know about, there is the further world we make," and "what we make,
we first intend. 36
Thus, cultural achievements like language, religion, and art, as well
as social institutions like the state, the law, and the economy are all
constituted-made real-by intentional human acts of meaning.37
Moreover, not only do our intentional acts of meaning transform our
natural, social, and cultural environments, but through our intentional
acts of meaning we also constitute and transform ourselves.38 Our
intentional acts of meaning shape the characters we come to possess.
Accordingly, in this vast field where meaning is constitutive, human
responsibility is greatest and human freedom reaches its highest
point.4" In the field of constitutive meaning,
[t]here occurs the emergence of the existential subject, finding
out for himself that he has to decide for himself what he is to
make of himself. It is there that individuals become alienated
from community, that communities split into factions, that
cultures
41 flower and decline, that historical causality exerts its
sway.
Because the constitutive function of meaning forces us to confront, in
our lives as individuals and communities, this "moment of existential
crisis" when we recognize that we make ourselves through the choices
and decisions inherent in our intentional acts of meaning, 42 "reflection
on meaning and the consequent control of meaning" is crucial. 43 There
is, Lonergan stresses, nothing fixed or immutable about the reality we
construct through our acts of meaning. 4 We change social and
cultural entities like the law-indeed, we change ourselves-through
changes in meaning. As Lonergan explains, the state, the law, and the
economy "are not fixed and immutable entities. They adapt to
changing circumstances; they can be reconceived in the light of new
ideas; they can be subjected to revolutionary change. But all such

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 253.
Id.
LONERGAN, METHOD INTHEOLOGY, supra note 9, at 78.

Lonergan, Dimensions of Meaning, supra note 33, at 254.
Id.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 255.
Id.
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change involves change of meaning . . . . ,,4 Thus, for example, a
state is made real through its constitution. The state can be changed by
adopting a new constitution or rewriting the old one. Or, the state can
be changed through a shift in the meaning of the existing constitutional
text. "More subtly but no less effectively [the state] can be changed by
reinterpreting the constitution .... ,46
Because these sorts of social and cultural changes are fundamentally
changes in meaning, Lonergan sees an urgent need for us to be more
reflective and responsible with respect to the changes in meaning that
go on around us and within us. 47 He diagnoses a crisis of culture: We
understand the great degree to which our world is mediated by
meaning (modern culture interprets, thematizes, and analyzes
everything), but this "vast modem effort to understand meaning in all
its manifestations has not been matched by a comparable effort in
judging meaning. 48 The necessity of this effort is clear: The human
person must judge and decide, if the person is to exist as authentically
human.4 9 We must subject to critical reflection the acts of meaning that
shape us and our society-including legal acts of meaning-if there is
to be progress rather than decline.
In a similar fashion, White elaborates a conception of the law as an
activity "by which meaning and community are established. 50 He
contends that the law usefully can be viewed as a meaning-making
activity concerned with the art of constituting character, community,
and culture in language.5 The life of the law is therefore "a life of art,
the art of making meaning in language with others. 52 This conception
of the law is driven by White's hope that it can serve as a ground upon
which criticism of particular laws and the legal culture can rest,53 and
additionally can
help us understand what lawyers and judges at their
54
best might do.
White describes legal language in a fashion that closely corresponds
to Lonergan's discussion of the constitutive function of meaning:

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

51.
52.
53.
54.

supra note 9, at 78.
Id. (emphasis added).
Lonergan, Dimensions of Meaning, supra note 33, at 255-56.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 264.
WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 32, at xiii.
Id. at xi-xiii.
Id. at xii.
Id. at xiii, xv.
Id. at xv.
LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY,
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The language that the lawyer uses and remakes is a language of
meaning in the fullest sense. It is a language in which our
perceptions of the natural universe are constructed and related,
in which our values and motives are defined, in which our
methods of reasoning are elaborated and enacted; and it gives us
our terms for constructing a social universe by defining roles
and actors and by establishing expectations as to the propriety
of speech and conduct."
Moreover, in language that strikingly evokes the Lonerganian
transcendental precepts "Be attentive, Be intelligent, Be reasonable, Be
responsible, 56 White describes the law as "a set of attitudes and
questions, a way of giving attention to experience, a kind of
intellectual activity worked out in performance":'
[E]very time we act as lawyers we create and claim a set of
meanings: about the events, about the institutions of which we
are part, about the very language which we speak;
and for the
58
meanings that we make we are deeply responsible.
For White, the law is not simply a body of rules to be managed and
applied; rather, it is an activity involving a set of resources for thought
and argument. 59 It is a language that our culture makes available for
speech and argument on those occasions that the culture deems as
legal. 60 Thus, it is all of the technical and nontechnical resourcesrules, constitutions, statutes, judicial opinions, maxims, general
understandings, conventional wisdom-"that a lawyer might use in
defining his or her position and urging another to accept it. ' '6 I And
while the law is an activity that works through this inherited language,
as given by an established culture in an existing community, White's
central claim is that in using these materials, the activity that is the law
transforms them.62
According to White, the study of the law is an inquiry into the ways
in which "we constitute ourselves as individuals, as communities, and
as cultures, whenever we speak" as lawyers and judges. 63 The
identity, meaning, and authority of the legal resources at hand is
always arguable; the materials are always being creatively reformulated
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 36.
LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY, supra note

9, at 20.

WHrrE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 32, at ix (emphasis added).

Id. at xii (emphasis added).
Id. at xi-xii.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 33.
See, e.g., id. at xi.
Id. at 35.
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or remade through their use in the process of argument. Every use of
legal language is a claim that such language is being used
authoritatively and appropriately: "The language I am speaking is the
proper language of justice in our country." 64 Moreover, every time
one speaks as a lawyer or judge, one constitutes an ethos or character
for oneself, for one's audience, as well as for the community and the
legal culture.65
Consider the following example: The same textual resource-the,
words of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution ("No State shall ...deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws")-supported both the
regime of "separate but equal" segregation and the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education,66 which initiated the era of
desegregation in schools and society. 67 But the ways lawyers found to
speak about that text, and the change in meaning ultimately "grasped
and accepted ' 68 by the Supreme Court, played a significant role in
reconstituting the character of our legal culture and our civil
community. It gave certain speakers new roles, placed certain
arguments out of bounds, and made new ways of acting possible.
This example highlights the conceptual power in White's view of
the law:
To look at law in this way is to direct one's attention ... to the
way in which we create new meanings, new possibilities for
meaning, in what we say; to the way our [legal] literature can be
regarded as a literature of value and motive and sentiment; to
the way in which our enterprise is a radically ethical one, by
which self and community are perpetually reconstituted; and to
the limits that our nature or our culture, our circumstances and
to remake our languages
our imagination, place on our powers
9
and communities in new forms.
Moreover, the example reveals the powerful insight underlying
Lonergan's emphasis on the importance of the constitutive function of
meaning: "[I]f social and cultural changes are, at root, changes in the
meanings that are grasped and accepted, changes in the control of
meaning mark off the great epochs in human history."7 °
Id. at 34.
Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Id. at 493.
See infra text accompanying note 70.
69. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 32, at 41.
70. Lonergan, Dimensions of Meaning, supra note 33, at 255-56.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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If changes in the control of meaning can have such important
consequences, it would be wise for lawyers to recognize, explicitly
and responsibly, that the use of legal language is always a constitutive
response to questions like these: What kind of community should we
who are talking the language of the law establish with each other, with
our clients, and with the rest of the world? What kind of conversation
should the law constitute, and what sort of conversation should
constitute the law, ourselves, and our community? 7' Accordingly,
understanding the law in this way helps us, in our activity within the
legal process, to "make[] our choice of language conscious rather than
habitual [so as to] create[] a moment at which controlled change of
language and culture becomes possible."72
IV. LAW AS A FORM OF COMMON SENSE KNOWING
SUBJECT To GENERAL BIAS

White's conception of the law can also be brought into fruitful
dialogue with Lonergan's analysis of practical common sense. In this
realm of common sense, intelligent inquiry generates spontaneous
questions about what to do, and about how things relate to us, rather
than to one another.73 These questions give rise to an accumulation of
insights about practical, everyday issues, and then to spontaneous
collaboration among people in testing and improving those insights.
Common sense both "aim[s] at mastering the concrete and the
particular," and achieves that aim "in a concrete and particular
manner." 74 It does this by bringing to bear in any particular context
"an habitual but incomplete set of insights that [is] completed with
appropriate variations in each concrete set of circumstances that call[s]
for speech or action., 75 Thus, common sense "consists in a set of
insights that remains incomplete, until 76there is added at least one
further insight into the situation in hand.
The activity of the law can be understood as a particular form of this
sort of practical common sense. The resources of the legal culture,
such as the Constitution, statutes, and judicial opinions, are, in a
sense, an accumulation of past insights. This set of accumulated
7 1. See WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 32, at 34.
72. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING:

CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 273 (1984) [hereinafter
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING].

73.
74.
75.
76.

See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 6, at 174.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 175.
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insights remains incomplete until it is brought to bear in an individual
case. Within the context of that case, those accumulated insights are
tested, evaluated, and improved in the creative search for the new
insight which will guide action and govern decision in that case."
Thus, for example, White describes the law as an activity in which
people interact with a body of authoritative legal material (in
Lonerganian terms, the accumulation of past insights) and the
circumstances and events of the actual world in a given instance. 8
Moreover, as with Lonergan's description of common sense, the law
is a process of intellectual development that is always incomplete, "that
79
is ever to be completed differently in each concrete situation":
"[O]ne's knowledge of the law, [like one's knowledge of a language,]
is never complete.... The speaker of ordinary competence constantly
invents new ways to use the language." 80
The incompleteness of the collaborative process of accumulating and
applying legal insights is reflected in White's characterization of the
judicial opinion as part of a "continuing and collective process of
conversation and judgment." 8' In the ongoing process of conversation
that is the law, "authoritative conclusions are reached after explicit
argument. These decisions in their turn become the material of future
arguments leading to future decisions, and so on in a continuing
process of opening and closure, argument and judgment, of which no
one can claim to foresee the end."82
In addition, the activity of the legal process in the context of a
concrete piece of litigation can be seen as a testing of past insights and
as a conversational and argumentative search for the additional insight
that will provide the foundation for judgment in the case at hand. Like
the new practical situations that are the context for the intellectual
development of common sense, a legal case always brings

77. Cf. GRANFIELD, supra note 5, at 130-31.
78. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 32, at 52.
79. LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 6, at 211.
80. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 32, at 53.
81. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 72, at 264.
82. Id. at 264. See also Kenneth F. Ripple, Process of Constitutional Decision
Ripple explains that judicial
Making, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 331, 334-35 (1991).
opinions are "important intellectual fodder in the constitutional dialogue"; and that even
[i]f a judge has failed to convince his or her colleagues that they ought to
follow a particular course, the judge[, through concurring and dissenting
opinions,] still has the opportunity to convince the judges of the other
circuits. That dialogue can indeed be a most fertile opportunity for the
exposition of all facets of a problem.
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to the surface hitherto unseen tensions and contradictions in our
social life and culture. The legal case is ... a way of testing the

presuppositions of the culture, forcing to the bright center of the
mind difficulties we wish to push back into the twilight. This
means that the case is always an invitation to the reconstitution
of the language in the light of new circumstances and new
intractabilities.
White's recognition that each case is an invitation for the language
of the law to develop in some new way parallels Lonergan's analysis
of the way in which emergent probability operates in the realm of
common sense. Emergent probability is Lonergan's term for the
dynamic nature of change and development in the world; it refers to the
dynamic structure that underlies the field of human events and
relationships. New opportunities for action and for the creation of
social and cultural institutions are constantly emerging out of the
accumulation of past human actions. These new opportunities provide
the setting for conscious human choice. Thus, the institutions and
social systems that guide human affairs do not arise or function in an
inevitable fashion.84
Because the creation of new systems and the emergence of new
orders is not inevitable, great importance attaches to the unrestricted
operation of the spirit of inquiry that leads to insight and ultimately to
choice of action. The human person does not have to wait passively
for his environment to shape him. Instead, conscious human choice
can direct the course of history towards either progress or decline:
[C]ommonly accessible insights, disseminated by
communication and persuasion, modify and adjust mentalities to
determine the course of history out of the alternatives offered
by emergent probability.85
[I]nsight is an anticipation of possible [systems, orders, and
institutions], and decision brings about the concrete conditions
of their functioning86 instead of merely waiting for such
conditions to happen.
Accordingly, a proper understanding of the operation of common
sense allows human choice to exercise control over the unfolding of
emergent probability:
[M]an can discover emergent probability; he can work out the
manner in which prior insights and decisions determine the
83. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 72, at 265.
84. LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 6, at 209.
85. Id. at 211.
86. Id. at 227.
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possibilities and probabilities of later- insights and decisions; he
can guide his present decisions in the light of their influence on
future insights and decisions; finally, this control of emergent
probability of the future can be exercised not only by the
individual in choosing his career and in forming his character,
not only by adults in educating the younger generation, but also
by mankind in its consciousness of its responsibility to the
future of mankind.87
So too, explicitly understanding the law as an activity of meaning-'
making that is constitutive of character and community should "lead to
richer and more accurate teaching and practice of law and to a greater
sense of control over what we do' 88 and who we become.
If, then, this opportunity for control is to manifest itself in progress
rather than decline in a given field of practical common sense
knowing-including the field of the law-it is important that there be
an unhindered pursuit of the sort of intelligent questioning which gives
rise to insights into prospective courses of action and which allows full
evaluation and critique of those courses of action. Yet, it is clearly a
part of lived human experience that such unhindered questioning is not
an automatic occurrence. Lonergan analyzes the reality of blocks to
this sort of unhindered questioning using the idea of bias.
Biases impede the proper operation of practical common sense by
preventing or distorting the further question that is inherent in
intelligence itself. The reflective moment in the human cognitional
process can only move to judgment and affirm an insight as true or
false, good or bad, to be done or not to be done, when the knower can
affirm that there are no further pertinent questions to be asked. 89 Bias,
however, cuts off this process of questioning too soon.
Lonergan identifies several types of question-distorting biases.
Individual bias, for example, is a refusal to ask all the relevant
questions as a result of a distorted egoism. It involves a refusal to
move to "the self-abnegation involved in allowing complete free play
to intelligent inquiry." Thus, a person operating out of individual bias
will give free rein to the "Eros of the mind, the desire and drive to
understand," where his own interests are concerned, but he will fail to
87. Id. See also Cynthia S.W. Crysdale, Revisioning Natural Law: From the
Classicist Paradigm to Emergent Probability,56 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 464, 476 (1995).
Through the exercise of conscious choice, human persons "have a unique role in
affecting probabilities. Human persons can and do foresee possibilities and pursue them
in an effort to create systems, to create conditions for the emergence of new orders or
devise mechanisms to offset the demise of current orders." Id.
8 8. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 32, at 40 (emphasis added).
89. LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 6, at 284.

1996]

Law School as a Culture of Conversation

351

give serious consideration to the further relevant questions prompted
by that desire to understand when those questions diverge from his
own interests. 90 Group bias operates in a similar fashion with respect
to a group or a class.
General bias, in contrast, is a bias of practical common sense itself;
it is refusal on the part of common sense to recognize and appreciate
the important further pertinent questions that are raised by other fields,
by other realms of inquiry. As Lonergan explains, common sense
is incapable of analyzing itself, incapable of making the
discovery that it too is a specialized development of human
knowledge, incapable of coming to grasp that its peculiar
danger is to extend its legitimate concern for the concrete and
the immediately practical into disregard for larger issues and
indifference to long-term results. 91
This short-sightedness of common sense, this impatience with any
kind of theoretical knowing, can lead to a long-term cycle of decline:
[T]he general bias of common sense prevents it from being
effective in realizing ideas, however, appropriate and reasonable,
that suppose a long view or that set up higher integrations or
that involve the solution of intricate and disputed issues. The
challenge of history is for man progressively to restrict the
realm of chance or fate or destiny and progressively
to enlarge
9
the realm of conscious grasp and deliberate choice.
Thus, Lonergan concludes' that practical common sense needs to be
guided, but is incompetent to choose its own guide.
The law, too, can suffer from this general bias of short-sightedness.
For example, some judges and legal practitioners increasingly seem to
conclude that-at least at the nation's elite law schools-legal
education has taken a turn toward esoteric theory which offers little by
way of practical insight to those laboring in the trenches of the law.9 3
This narrow focus on practical issues sets up a misleading oppositional
relationship between "theoretical" and "practical" scholarship that
exemplifies general bias and that fails to see the critical interaction that
must exist between theory and common sense practice, between the
general and the particular. As White explains,
[i]t is often the most theoretical work that will prove of
surprising practical value, often the immersion in practical
particularities that will stimulate the most valuable thought of a
•90. Id. at 220-22.
91. Id. at 226.
92. Id. at 228.
93. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education
and the Legal Profession,91 MIcH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
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general kind. Much of the life of the law in fact lies in the
constant interaction it requires between the particular and the
general, between the practical and the theoretical. The danger to
watch out for may accordingly be the turn of mind that focuses
on theory alone, dismissive of mere details, or on particulars
alone, dismissive of mere generalization.94
Both of these overreactions-a focus on theory alone or on particulars
alone-are manifestations of a general bias that precludes the
exploration of all further relevant questions, thereby preventing us
from realizing illuminating insights.
A general bias of short sightedness is also inherent in a conception
of the law as simply a system of institutionally established and
managed rules. "Law is in this sense objectified and made a
structure." 95 Such a static view of the law fails to capture the way in
which the law itself is transformed by its creative application in evernew concrete situations. Similarly the law can be seen as a machinelike bureaucratic component of the structures of government:
Law then becomes reducible to two features: policy choices and
techniques of their implementation. Our questions are, "What
do we want?" and "How do we get it?" In this way the
conception of law as a set of rules merges with the conception of
law as a set of institutions and processes. The overriding
metaphor is that of the machine; the overriding value is that of
efficiency, conceived of as96 the attainment of certain ends with
the smallest possible CoStS.
To the extent that a bureaucratic ends-means rationality takes over the
law and excludes any consideration of how a given decision will affect
the course of the law over the longer term, general bias is apparent.
Each of these misconceptions of the law-misconceptions that make
the lawyer into a technician manipulating rules in particular practical
contexts-are implicated in the crisis of meaning and value described
in Part I of this Article. Moreover, legal education that, implicitly or
explicitly, fosters these misconceptions also cuts off lines of further
relevant questions which take the lawyer beyond the narrow role of
amoral technician. As such, legal education is infected by, and
inculcates, general bias. The question then becomes, how might we
avoid this danger?

94. James Boyd White, Law Teachers' Writing, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 1970 (1993)
(reacting to Judge Edwards' article) [hereinafter White, Law Teachers' Writing].
95. WHITE, HERACLES' BOW, supra note 32, at 29.
96. Id. at 30-31.

Law School as a Culture of Conversation

1996]
V.

LAW SCHOOL AS A CULTURE OF CONVERSATION

We have seen that viewing the law as a species of Lonerganian
practical common sense alerts us to the danger of general bias in the
law. 97 This Part suggests that White's understanding of the law as a
form of constitutive rhetoric, operating within a culture of argument
and conversation, is very helpful in demonstrating how that danger can
be combatted. 98 White's emphasis on the importance of viewing the
law as a culture of argument and a process of conversation allows his
conception of the law to be placed within the framework of Lonergan's
effort to describe how the longer cycle of decline rooted in general bias
can be reversed: White's emphasis on the law as a culture of argument
is analogous to Lonergan's invocation of culture as the vehicle for
reversing general bias.
A. The CulturalContext of Cosmopolis as a Check on Bias
For Lonergan, the exaltation of common-sense practicality that
slides into the longer cycle of decline must be countered by culture, 99
man's capacity to ask "what he himself is about. His culture is his
capacity to ask, to reflect, to reach an answer that at once satisfies his
intelligence and speaks to his heart."' 00 Culture, then, acts as a
counterbalance to the general bias of common sense, because it is "a
representative of detached intelligence that both appreciates and
criticizes, that identifies the good neither with the new nor with the
old.",'0 '
Lonergan sometimes refers to this cultural counterbalance as
cosmopolis.102 Cosmopolis is the particular conception of culture that
provides the necessary context for critical reflection on common sense
knowing. 103 It "is founded on the native detachment and
97. See supra Part IV.
98. See infra Part V.A-C.
99. For Lonergan, "[a] culture is simply the set of meanings and values that inform
the way of life of a community." Bernard Lonergan, Revolution in Catholic Theology,
in A SECOND COLLECTION 232 (William F.J. Ryan & Bernard J. Tyrrell eds., 1974).
White similarly understands culture as "a set of ways of making sense of things and

acting in the world."

JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION:

AN ESSAY IN

CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM xiii (1990).
100. See LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 6,at 236.
101. ld. at 237.
102. See id. at 236-42.
103. Id. at 241. Cosmopolis
invites the vast potentials and pent-up energies of our time to contribute to
[solving contemporary problems] by developing an art and a literature, a
theatre and a broadcasting, a journalism and a history, a school and a
university, a personal depth and a public opinion, that through appreciation
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disinterestedness of every intelligence,"'' 0 4 and "[i]ts business is to
prevent practicality from being short-sightedly practical and so
destroying itself."'0 5 Cosmopolis performs this function by
recognizing that we need others and their questions and insights in
order to overcome bias. Cosmopolis, therefore, can be described as
the intersubjective cultural community that offers to common sense
"the corrections and the assurance that result from learning accurately
the tested insights of others and from submitting one's own insights to
the criticism based on others' experience and development,"' '
While Lonergan sees the cultural context of cosmopolis as a check
on common sense that somehow remains outside common sense,
White's view of the law as a culture of argument brings the function of
cosmopolis within the activity of the law itself. Thus, for example, the
lawyer's recognition of the law as a form of constitutive rhetoric
within a culture of argument "should define the lawyer's own work as
far less manipulative, selfish, or goal-oriented ... and as far more
creative, communal, and intellectually challenging."' 7 Similarly, the
judicial opinion
might be far more accurately and richly understood if it were
seen not as a bureaucratic expression of ends-means rationality
but as a statement by an individual mind or a group of
individual minds exercising their responsibility to decide a case
as well as they can and to
08 determine what it shall mean in the
language of the culture.1
Understanding the judicial opinion in this way also highlights the
important role played by the judge within the legal culture of argument.
Within White's conception of the law, the character of the judge seems
to be a crucial check on problems that Lonergan would characterize as
individual, group, and general bias. The judge serves as such a check
by, in effect, reaching judgment in such a way that, in Lonerganian
and criticism give men of common sense the opportunity and help they need
and desire to correct the general bias of their common sense.
Id.
104. Id. at 238.
105. Id. at 238-39.
106. Id. at 191 (emphasis added). See also Martin J. Matustik, Democratic
Multicultures and Cosmopolis: Beyond the Aporias of the Politics of Identity and
Difference, 12 METHOD: J. OF LONERGAN STUD. 80-85 (1994) (describing cosmopolis as
the cultural community within which lies that "ongoing critical praxis" that makes
possible "reversing bias and stabilizing insights"; "flit is the nonpolitical cultural fact
of irony, satire and humor that calls our attention to the cleavages within prejudiced and
hegemonic relations. This is the role of cosmopolis.").
107.

WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 32, at 41.

108.

Id. (emphasis added).
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terms, gives us confidence that all the further pertinent questions have
been considered:
The ideal judge would be a judge who put his (or her)
fundamental attitudes and methods to the test of sincere
engagement with arguments the other way. We could ask, does
the judge see the case before him as the occasion for printing
out an ideology, for displaying technical skill, or as presenting a
real difficulty, calling for real thought? The ideal judge would
show that he had listened to the side he voted against and that he
had felt the pull of the arguments both ways. The law that was
made that way would comprise two voices, those of the parties,
in a work made by another, by the judge who had listened to
both and had faced the conflict between them in an honest way.
In this sense the judge's most important work is the definition
of his own voice, the character he makes for himself as he works
through a case. 109
B. The Law School as a Culture of Conversation
Promoting Conversion
If the conception of the law articulated by White truly is to include a
cultural check on the problems of bias inherent in the process of
practical common sense, the sort of attitude and character displayed by
the ideal judge must be inculcated within the legal culture more
generally. Thus, White's way of looking at the law must also affect
the teaching and objectives of American law schools-the prospective
lawyer's point of entry into the legal culture of argument. Indeed,
White contends that seeing law as a form of constitutive rhetoric
demands a different method of teaching in the law school." 0 Under
such a view of the law,
[t]he law we teach would not be regarded as a set of institutions
that "we" manipulate either to achieve "our policies" as
governors, nor "our interests" as lawyers, but rather as a
language and a community-a world, made partly by others and
partly by ourselves, in which we and others shall live, and which
will be tested less by its distributive effects than by the resources
of meaning it creates and the community it constitutes: who we
become to ourselves and to one another when we converse. And
our central question would become how to understand and to
judge those things."'
Law school, then, is not about learning the rules and how to
109. Id. at 47.
110. Id. at43.
111. Id. at 43-44.
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manipulate them. Rather, it is about acquiring certain habits of mind, a
certain ability to question and converse with the resources available in
the legal culture, with one's clients, and with one's colleagues.
Moreover, through this process of questioning and conversation, the
law school itself can be seen as an important component of the
cosmopolis that works to reverse general bias. As White advises
incoming law students,
in doing [law school work,] you will subject your own views and
inclinations to the discipline of the inherited culture and the
conditions of the world. You will have a chance, sometimes, not
only to maintain
1 2 but to improve the culture of which you
become a part.'
Further, the law students' interaction with professors and legal
scholarship during their time in law school helps to give the students
the sort of broader, "cosmopolitan" perspective that can assist them in
warding off the deleterious effects of general bias. As writers and
scholars, rather than full-time practitioners, law professors have "the
chance to stand back from the world of detail and of practice and to try
to see something in it, to find something to say about it, of a more
general nature than would likely emerge from the press of life in
practice."'
Lonergan's notions of horizon and conversion are helpful tools for
understanding how this "cosmopolitan" habit of mind that is open to
pursuing all of the further pertinent questions is acquired. Law
students may well arrive at law school with horizons-pre-existing
structures of knowledge and experience-that block unfettered
operation of the unrestricted desire to know. Because of one's
history, education, experience, and personal development, certain
questions may be blocked from one's field of vision.' 4
Law school, ideally, provides opportunities for students to
experience "re-horizoning." Such a conversion to a new horizon can
take place through the case analysis that is such a major component of
the law school experience. Instead of studying cases simply as
structures in which doctrinal rules are embodied," 5 learning to read a
judicial opinion (in many ways, the primary work of law school)
should largely be a process of learning to engage in a new form of
questioning. It can be a special kind of reading that is really a form of
112. Id. at 54.
113. Id. at 55.
1 14. See LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY, supra note 9, at 236-37.
115. Cf. notes 18-24 and accompanying text (discussing Langdell's introduction of
the "case method" of legal study).

1996]

Law School as a Culture of Conversation

conversation with a text: "reading as a6 species of thought, with a
reconstructive and critical imagination."'

As a law student engages the opinion, for example, he must
imaginatively put himself in the place of the lawyer representing each
of the parties. What additional facts would the lawyer want to know
and why?
The lawyer examines and reexamines the [client's] story, asking
questions and more questions until he (or she) is satisfied that he
has "enough" to enable him to turn to his books; what he reads
there will suggest new questions, to which the answers will
suggest new lines of legal inquiry, and so it goes, a jostling
between the facts and the law throughout the life of the case.
[The law student] can
117 at least begin this process with every case
[he or she] read[s].
Similarly, the student conversing with an opinion must place himself
in the position of the judge who wrote the opinion:
How would you decide this case? How would you explain and
defend your judgment? At this stage, the process of the law is
no longer, if it ever was, a matter of argumentative skill and
intellectual deftness. It is a matter of judging right and wrong,
better and worse, of coming to terms with the necessity and
difficulty of judgment. The simple question-"How should
this case be decided?"-presents
a puzzle and a challenge that
18
can occupy a life.'
Learning to enter into a judicial opinion in this way is a process of
giving oneself over to the questions prompted by the unrestricted
desire to know. Such study requires the student to learn how to keep
putting questions to the text, to the facts, to the parties involved, and to
the judge, and to follow those questions wherever they may lead." 9
Moreover, through the process of critically analyzing a series of
opinions in this way, through the enterprise of responding to questions
raised by the teacher, and through the experience of engaging in
conversation and argument with fellow students in and out of class
with respect to legal issues, the law student begins to engage in a
116.
117.
118.
119.

WHITE, HERACLES' Bow, supra note 32, at 57 (emphasis added).
Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
Cf. Vernon Gregson, Theological Method and Theological Collaboration11, in

THE DESIRES OF THE HUMAN HEART: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEOLOGY OF BERNARD

LONERGAN 95-96 (Vernon Gregson ed., 1988) (intellectual conversion is about knowing
and using a set of basic questions: "What is the evidence for what you say?," "Why do
you understand it that way and no other?," "On what do you base your assurance that your
understanding is true?").
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process that Lonergan calls dialectic;120 a process that can have a
powerfully "re-horizoning" effect. This process of dialectic is a
technique that brings conflicts to light and promotes conversion by
making subjective differences objective. By clarifying the differences
that exist within opinions and between students, this process (1)
allows those differences to be questioned and examined, (2) exposes
students to new and different ways of thinking and understanding, as
well as to unfamiliar experiences, and (3) raises a new range of
questions in the students' minds and hearts. Through this process, the
technique of Lonerganian dialectic promotes conversion to
horizons
2'
experience.1
of
range
broader
a
and
questions
more
to
open
The conversion that Lonergan envisions, and that law school can
foster, is a process of finding out for oneself and in oneself what it is
to be intelligent, to be reasonable, and to be responsible; 22 in short,
conversion entails ever more whole-hearted fidelity to the unrestricted
desire to know. The process of dialectic involved in legal education
understood as part of a culture of argument and conversation
contributes to this sort of conversion "by pointing out ultimate
differences, by offering the example of others that differ radically from
oneself, by providing the occasion for a reflection, a self-scrutiny, that
can lead to a new understanding of oneself and one's destiny."' 123 This
dialectic of questioning, conversation, and argument is not an
"automatically efficacious"' 24 path to conversion, but it does create the
opportunity for potentially transformative encounters with other people
and their ideas. The opportunity for such encounters is crucial,
because "encounter is the one way in which self-understanding and
horizon can be put to the test.' ' 25 Thus, the process of dialectic
provides "the open-minded, the serious, the sincere with the occasion
to ask themselves some basic questions, first, about others but
eventually, even about themselves.
It will make conversion a topic
' 26
it.'
promote
and thereby
C. Conversion and the Demands of Authentic Conversation
Lonergan contends that the formula for achieving detachment from
bias and moving to a horizon open to greater fidelity to the unrestricted
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See LONERGAN, METHOD
Id. at 235, 251-53.
Id. at 253.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 253.

IN THEOLOGY,

supra note 9, at 235-66.
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desire to know is "acontinuous and ever more exacting application of
the transcendental precepts. Be attentive. Be intelligent. Be
reasonable. Be responsible."'' 27 One scholar, David Tracy, has
transformed those precepts into a set of rules for conversation that are
an apt characterization of what the law school culture of argument and
conversation should be:
[S]ay only what you mean; say it as accurately as you can; listen
to and respect what the other says, however different or other; be
willing to correct or defend your opinions if challenged by the
conversation partner; be willing to argue if necessary, to
confront if demanded, to endure necessary conflict, to change
your mind if the evidence suggests it. These are merely some
generic rules for questioning. As good rules, they are worth
keeping in mind in case the questioning does begin to break
down.
In a sense they are merely variations of the
transcendental imperatives elegantly articulated by Bernard
Lonergan ....128
Conversation conducted in accord with these rules promotes "rehorizoning" by keeping the conversation partners faithful to the
demands of the unrestricted desire to know and by inviting them to
explore the new possibilities for thinking and living that are
encountered in an authentic conversation:
Conversation in its primary form is an exploration of
possibilities in the search for truth. In following the track of
any question, we must allow for difference and otherness. At
the same time, as the question takes over, we notice that to attend
to the other as other, the different as different, is also to
understand the different as possible. 29
To learn to converse in this way is to learn to explore possibilities,
difference, and otherness; through the encounters revealed by that
exploration, conversion to a new horizon becomes conceivable as an
option.
This notion of transformative conversation is richly developed by
Paul Ricoeur in ways that are useful in the law school context.
Ricoeur considers conversation as the decisive factor in phronesispractical wisdom guiding moral judgment in specific, concrete
127. Id. at 231.
128. TRACY, supra note 10, at 19. Interestingly, Tracy's rules for conversationwith their recognition of the need for argument, confrontation, and conflict-suggest
that an understanding of the law as a process of conversation can embrace both the realm
of the law school and the appellate courts (where conversation is a more obvious
description of how the law operates) and the more directly adversarial aspects of our
legal culture (including the trial and legislative processes). Id.
129. Id. at 20.
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situations. 30 Conversation in this sense involves a sharing and
refinement of convictions about possible actualizations of the human
good that is marked by the reciprocity and humility demanded by a
dynamic of human interaction that Ricoeur calls solicitude. 3 ' "It is
through public debate, friendly discussion, and
shared convictions that
' 32
formed."'
is
situation
[any]
in
judgment
moral
This decisive role for conversation is the third step in a descriptive
analysis of practical wisdom. The first step of this analysis roots
practical wisdom in a teleological "ethical intention": "aiming at the
'good life' with andfor others in just institutions.'' 133 This good life is
the end to which human actions are directed. Practical judgment in this
sense becomes the ongoing process of ensuring that there is
adequation, or a sense of coherence and integration, between the
ethical agent's developing conception of that good life and the
particular, concrete decisions and choices b which the agent
instantiates his or her ideal conception in actions.'4
Because of the human penchant for evil-the potential for human
actions to be biased by self-love-practical wisdom must include a
second element as well: It is necessary to test one's judgments
regarding actions aimed at the realization of the good life by passing
them through the universalizing sieve of moral obligation. 35 Through
a process of argumentation involving the exchange and examination of
arguments whose validity is rooted in universalizable reasons, the
morality of obligation is "the means of testing our illusions about
ourselves and about the meaning of our inclinations that hide [and
distort] the aim of the good life.' 36
Practical reasoning, however, cannot simply remain on this level of
universalizable argumentation. When the ethics of argumentation is
tested, not according to the criterion of universalizability, but along the
path of actualization through application in concrete circumstances,
130. PAUL RICOEUR, ONESELF AS ANOTHER 290 (Kathleen Blarney trans., 1992).
13 1. Id. at 188; see also infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text.
132. RICOEUR, supra note 130, at 290-91.
133. Id. at 172 (emphasis added).
134. Id. at 179.
135. See id. at 170, 218.
136. Id. at 240. Ricoeur initially discusses this illusion-exposing, universalizing
deontological moment in terms of two versions of the Kantian categorical imperative.
First, "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
should become a universal law." Second, "Act in such a way that you always treat
humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a
means, but always at the same time as an end." Id. at 208, 222 n.33. Ricoeur identifies
Habermas's discourse ethics as the "exemplary form of the universalist thesis" today.
Id. at 284.
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conflicts can arise that demand further reflection:
The possibility of conflict arises ... as soon as the otherness of
persons, inherent in the very idea of human plurality, proves to
be, in certain remarkable circumstances, incompatible with the
universality of the rules that underlie the idea of humanity.
Respect then tends to split up into respect for the law and respect
for persons. Under these conditions, practical wisdom may
consist in giving priority to the respect for persons in the name
of solicitude that is addressed to persons in their irreplaceable
singularity. 37
Solicitude is the dialogic component of the ethical intention; it is a
notion that captures our experience of recognizing that the good life is
inseparable from life with andfor others.138 Ricoeur's discussion of
solicitude is grounded in the importance of friendship (with its
characteristics of reciprocity and sharing a common life) articulated in
Aristotle's examination of the good life. 139 "[S]olicitude adds
essentially the dimension of lack, the fact that we need friends"' 140 to
the notion of self-esteem (the reflexive movement in which one
recognizes and esteems oneself as a self with a desire for, and a
capacity to pursue, the good life). I cannot actualize my self-esteem
unless I am open to relationships with others in which solicitude is
both given and received.
Thus, solicitude is a concept of mutuality and reciprocity in giving
and receiving between human beings who each esteem themselves;
through the operation of this intersubjective dynamic, "the self
perceives itself as another among others."' 4' This perception includes
recognition of a reversibility of roles, as well as the nonsubstitutability
and irreplaceability of particular persons. Accordingly, while the roles
of "I' and "You" are reversible, persons are not: each person in his or
her singularity and uniqueness is irreplaceable in our affection and
esteem. The voice of solicitude, therefore, demands that "the plurality
of persons and their otherness not be obliterated by the globalizing idea
of humanity" that is inherent in a universalizing morality of
obligation. 4 2 Solicitude, then, is a regard of self for the other, a
unique and irreplaceable other whose appearance makes demands on,
and elicits a response from, the self. Through this regard of self for
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

RICOEUR, supra note 130, at 262.

Id. at 187.
Id. at 188.
Id. at 192.
Id.
Id. at 227.
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the other, solicitude strives to reestablish equality in relationships of
dissymetry.
In Ricoeur's view, the Golden Rule usefully articulates solicitude's
impetus for reciprocity in situations of dissymetry. 143 Ricoeur calls
attention to both the negative Talmudic formulation of the Rule, "Do
not do unto your neighbor what you would hate him to do to you,"
and the positive formulation of the Gospels: "Do unto others as you
would have them do to you."' 44 The negative formulation leaves room
for the "moral invention in the order of what is permitted"', 45 that is
essential to the operation of phronesis (the creative actualization of the
ethical aim in context), while the positive formulation highlights the
benevolent motivation-the impetus to do something on behalf of the
other-that is part of solicitude.' 46
The Golden Rule thus enunciates a norm of reciprocity that places
the other in the position of someone to whom I owe an obligation; the
other is a person to whom I must be faithful. And because "fidelity
consists in responding to the expectation of the other who is counting
on me, I must take [that] expectation" into account whenever I apply a
universal principle in a concrete situation. 47
The moment of conflict between the demands of universalization
and the demands of solicitude that can arise when universal norms are
applied in the contextual singularity of concrete situations-and the
indecision that can arise in the midst of that conflictual encounterleads Ricoeur to conversation as the third step and critical factor in
phronesis.148 Without the contextualization provided by conversation,
a process of argumentation
rooted in universalizable rules "loses its
149
actual hold on reality."'
The conversation envisioned by Ricoeur involves a subtle, creative
tension between argumentation-the give and take of generalizable
reasons-and conviction. The convictions at stake here are the
conceptions that humans have of what a good and complete life would
be. The confrontation involving a universal moral principle, the
actor's convictions, the expectation of fidelity of the other who is
relying on the actor (the expectation at the heart of solicitude), and the
143.
144.
145.
146.
to treat

Id. at 219.
Id.
Id.
See id.; see also Luke 6:31 (King James) ("Treat others as you would like them
you").
147. RICOEUR, supra note 130, at 268.
148. See id. at 287-91.
149. ld. at 286.
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complexity of life in concrete situations can lead the actor struggling
toward moral judgment to a question: Who am I? Or better, Who am I
to become through my action in this situation?
Conversation, then, is a process by which these convictionsembodied in concrete forms of life-are refined through a process of
questioning, argumentation, and consultation with people of wisdom,
experience, and moral competence. This process of conversational
winnowing raises the actor's initial conviction to a level of considered
conviction which seals decision in the concrete. Taking into account
the demands of universalization (can I universalize my reasons so as to
screen out individual biases and prejudices?) and the demands of
solicitude in this situation, I act out of my considered conviction as to
what the good life with and for others concretely demands in this
context.
The central movement at the heart of this process of conversation is
the exchange of convictions, an exchange of convictions that opens
deliberating actors to a new range of experiences and possible
actions. 15 ° These convictions-these different views as to how the
good life is embodied in the concrete-constitute the substance of the
conversation that informs concrete moral decision making.' 5' The
concrete forms of life rooted in the convictions of a particular other can
contain inchoate universals and possible truths; in Tracy's terms, these
are new possibilities for imagining other ways of thinking and
52
living.
It is these inchoate universals and possible truths that we encounter
and imaginatively experience in conversational exchange. As
Ricoeur's characterization of narrative as the "first laboratory of moral
judgment" suggests,1 53 the conversation he envisions consists of an
exchange of life experiences that assists the deliberating moral actor to
refine, modify, and evaluate his or her convictions by imagining how a
proposed action comports with the aim of the good life. In similar
fashion, the conversations that take place in the context of legal
education can be the first laboratory in which a humanly integrated
legal judgment is nurtured. Such conversations allow law students to
imagine how proposed actions comport with their visions of the good
54
life in just communities.
150. See, e.g., id. at 165 n.31, 245, 289.
151. Id. at 287-90.
152. TRACY, supra note 10, at xx.
153. RICOEUR, supra note 130, at 140.
154. Cf. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1983). Cover discusses the importance of "alternity"
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Through the exchange of experiences, those engaged in
conversation can explore their ethical reaction to proposed courses of
conduct with the aim of re-imagining their action. If the aim of the
good life is to be concretized in action, that aim must "be depicted in
the narratives through which we try out different courses of action by
playing, in the strong sense of the word, with competing
possibilities."'' 55 In this way, for Ricoeur just as for Lonergan,
conversation can result in "a conversion of the manner of looking" at
the possibilities for action in situation.'56 This sort of "playing" with
competing possibilities as a way of trying out different courses of
action can, and should, be an important part of the critical analysis of
judicial opinions that is such a major component of the law school
experience. Such "play" leads students imaginatively to consider the
possible worlds of legal meaning that might be constituted through
extension of a given opinion to different hypothetical situations, as
well as through different interpretations of the language crafted by the
judge in the opinion.
A similar understanding of conversation-as an enterprise enlarging
our awareness of the range of possibilities for human livingunderlies Clifford Geertz's description of the aim of those engaged in
ethnographic research: "We are seeking, in the widened sense of the
term in which it encompasses very much more than talk, to converse
with [those we encounter]."' 57 Thus, "the aim of anthropology is the
enlargement of the universe of human discourse."'' 58 The objective of
interpretive anthropology, therefore, is "to make available to us
answers that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given,
and thus
to include them in the consultable record of what man has
, 159
said."
Analogously, the conversation of the law student with a body of
judicial opinions and with the diverging views emerging from the
-imagined alternative states of affairs-in the law:
Law may be viewed as a system of tension or a bridge linking a concept of a
reality to an imagined alternative-that is, as a connective between two states
of affairs, both of which can be represented in their normative significance
only through the devices of narrative. . . . A nomos, as a world of law, entails
the application of human will to an extant state of affairs as well as toward our
visions of alternative futures. A nomos is a present world constituted by a
system of tension between reality and vision.
Id.
155. RICOEUR, supra note 130, at 165 n.31.
156. Id. at 245.
157. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 13 (1973).
158. Id. at 14.
159. Id. at30.
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convictions and the questions of his or her classmates and professors
enlarges the student's universe of discourse by making available to the
student a whole range of possible answers to the questions (legal and
otherwise) raised by the human situations that lie at the heart of legal
issues. Through this enlargement of the student's universe of
discourse, legal education functions as a form of Lonerganian
cosmopolis: a culture that counteracts general bias by widening the
vision of the deliberating actor. In the words of Dean Kronman, the
case method of legal instruction, at its best, cultivates "an attitude of
moral cosmopolitanism that is best expressed, perhaps, by the old
Roman motto nihil humanorum alienum meum est, 'nothing human is
foreign to me.""'
In addition, Ricoeur's understanding of the role that conversation
plays in moral decision making by mediating the conflict between
universal rules and concrete situations can usefully frame our
understanding of the application of general legal rules in concrete
situations. Just as ethics for Ricoeur cannot simply be a matter of
applying universal rules to particular situations, so too the law cannot
be reduced simply to the mechanical application of legal rules
(accumulated past insights articulated in generalized form); a proper
understanding of the law requires us to pay attention to the interplay
between the general and the particular.
For that reason, White insists that the law requires us "to think of
the particular in terms of the general, the general in terms of the
particular."' 6' Indeed, in "[a] true legal education," the student must
be trained "to see the ambiguities and complexities in what first looks
simple."'' 62 A legal education of this sort, which frees students to ask
all the relevant questions by pursuing the unrestricted desire to know
through a conversational process that brings into dialogue different
visions of how we want to constitute our communal reality, can be a
rich educational experience that goes a long way toward integrating the
personal and professional aspects of a lawyer's life. Legal education
understood in this way can have this sort of transformational effect on
the character of the law student
partly because it is a training in the respect due to others; partly
because it teaches us that in almost every case reasonable and
decent people can take radically opposing views, and therefore
that our opinions are not eternal truths; partly because it insists
upon the authority of procedures and institutions, which it in
160. KRONMAN, supra note 27, at 159 (first emphasis added).
161. See White, Law Teachers' Writing, supra note 94, at 1974.
162. Id.
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this way constitutes and maintains; [and] partly because it
by exploring the limits
perpetually tests and surprises the mind
63
of our discourses and imaginations.'

Such potentially transformative conversational encounters-if they
are true to the demands of authentic conversation-must inevitably
take on a humbly tentative or provisional nature. In Ricoeur's terms,
there is a "fragility" and a "vulnerability" inherent in the notion of
encounter through a conversational exchange of convictions.64 Thus,
if conversation is to be a mutual search for truth in which all parties
give themselves over to the process of following questions wherever
they lead, a high degree of open-mindedness is crucial. All the
conversation partners must be willing and open participants in the
conversational process of questioning.
If conversation with the other than self is to have the potential to
change convictions, the selves involved in the process must be open to
self-effacement; they must be able to ask themselves, in light of the
new possibilities they encounter, "Who am I?," "Who am I to
become?," "Who are we to become as a community?," and "Where am
I to take my stand?" As Ricoeur explains, "it is still necessary that the
irruption of the other, breaking through the enclosure of the same,
of effacement by which the
meet with the complicity of this movement
' 65

self makes itself available to others."'
Conversation partners, each of whom is other to the other, must be
open to this movement of effacement, if the questioning exchange of
convictions is to be truly mutual and reciprocal. This openness to selfeffacement, however, is not always part of the horizon that the student
brings to law school. Thus, conversational openness must be
modelled by teachers of law. In other words, their Socratic
examination of material in the classroom must be carried out in a
manner that encourages, facilitates, and nurtures open participation in
authentic questioning.
VI. THE ROLE OF THE JESUIT LAW SCHOOL

This vision of legal education does not require a radical overhaul of
the law school curriculum. Indeed, as we have seen, the case method
that typically dominates law school instruction can be an ideal vehicle
66
for opening students to the practice of authentic conversation.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. (emphasis added).
RICOEUR, supra note 130, at 22.
Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, implementation of this vision essentially demands that
teachers and students approach the study of the law with a new
attitude, with a conscious intentionality of striving to see their
endeavor as a conversational search for meaning and value and with a
commitment to establishing a classroom atmosphere in which such
conversation takes place.
Such an understanding of the nature and purpose of legal education
obviously places rigorous demands on both students and teachers. It
is rooted in a' desire to integrate the study of the law with the
fundamental human drive to question and in an understanding of the
law that sees law not as a set of rules to-be manipulated, but as an
activity through which we constitute ourselves and our communities.
While this vision is certainly not uniquely Catholic or Jesuit, I believe
that the commitments and traditions of the Society of Jesus may give
law schools that operate within the context of Jesuit universities unique
motivations and opportunities to implement this vision.
Striving to make the law school a culture of authentic conversation
through which we can imagine new possibilities for constituting good
lives and good communities by encountering the imaginative visions of
others is consistent with the Society's recent articulation of a
commitment to establishing a culture of dialogue as part of its
characteristic way of proceeding. Moreover, encouraging imaginative
encounters with new possibilities for living is also consistent with the
Society's traditions of imaginative pedagogy rooted in the Spiritual
Exercises. 67 The recent decrees of the Thirty-Fourth General
Congregation of the Society of Jesus ("GC 34") 168 place great
167. The Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius constitute a retreat manual whose aim is
to foster in the retreatant the "experience of prayer, prayerful deliberation, and
cooperation with God's graces." GEORGE E. GANSS, S.J., THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF ST.
IGNATIUS: A TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY vii (1992). The Exercises "are divided into
four groups, called 'Weeks.' The First Week consists of Exercises characteristic of the
purgative way, the purification of the soul which frees it to advance toward God." Id. at
5. "The Second Week presents Exercises proper to the illuminative way, the acquiring of
virtues in imitation of Christ." Id. at 6. The Third and Fourth Weeks are made up of
Exercises "characteristic of the unitive or perfective way: activities to establish
habitual and intimate union with God, through Christ." Id. at 7. The Exercises provide
the foundation for Jesuit life and mission, and illustrate the chief principles of Ignatian
spirituality. Id. at 8, 14.
168. A general congregation is "the highest legislative body in the Society [of
Jesus] beneath the [Plope." GEORGE E. GANSS, S.J., THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE SOCIETY

294 n. I (1970). The
Thirty-Fourth General Congregation met in Rome from January 5 to March 22, 1995, in
order to revise the law of the Society and renew the Society's mission in light of
contemporary challenges and circumstances. See DOCUMENTS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH
GENERAL CONGREGATION OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS xi; DI, n.l (John L. McCarthy S.J.
ed., St. Louis Institute of Jesuit Sources 1995) (hereinafter GC 34).
OF JESUS, TRANSLATED, WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND A COMMENTARY
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emphasis on dialogue as a distinctive characteristic of Jesuit
ministry.' 69 For example, the Congregation explains that:
[t]he Jesuit heritage of creative response to the call of the Spirit
in concrete situations of life is an incentive to develop a culture
of dialogue in our approach to believers of other religions. This
culture of dialogue should become a distinctive characteristicof
our Society, sent into the whole world to labor
70 for the greater
glory of God and the help of human persons.
Moreover, GC 34 identifies dialogue as an "integral dimension[ ]"of
the contemporary mission of the Society: "the service of faith and the
promotion of justice."' 7'1 Indeed, the faith "that does justice is ...the
faith that engages other traditions"-other ways of imagining the
human good-in dialogue.17
In addition, the dialogue called for by the General Congregation has
much in common with the notion of authentic conversation developed
in this paper. For example, it is a dialogue that must be conducted
with respect toward, and openness to, the dialogue partners with
whom we are engaged in a common search for meaning and value;
dialogue partners "who look together towards a shared human and
social freedom."' 7 3 Like Ricoeur's conversational exchange of
convictions, the dialogue envisioned by GC 34 demands an open and
reciprocal sharing of fundamental experiences of the human good:
One way of serving God's mystery of salvation is through
dialogue, a spiritual conversation of equal partners, that opens
human beings to the core of their identity. In such a dialogue,
we come into contact with the activity of God in the lives of
other men and women, and deepen our sense of this divine
action: "By dialogue, we let God be present in our midst; for as
we open ourselves 174in dialogue to one another, we also open
ourselves to God."
While the typical authentic conversation in the law school context
will rarely be a dialogue that can be characterized as "spiritual
conversation," true fidelity to all of the questions that present
themselves in our law school conversations, and genuine openness to
the convictions of the others whom we encounter, will inevitably bring
questions of God into play. The religiously and ideologically
pluralistic context of the contemporary law school is not, of course, a
169. See GC 34, supra note 168, at D2, nn.41-49.
170. Id. at D5, n.154 (emphasis added).
171. Id. atD2, n.48.
172. Id. at D2, n.49.
173. Id. at D2, n.42.
174. Id. at D4, n.101.
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forum for classroom catechesis. Still, we should guard against an
understanding of legal conversations that would preclude us from
giving ourselves wholly to the questions which might arise, and from
following those questions wherever they lead.'75
Second, a Jesuit law school that nurtures the practice of authentic
conversation is participating in a pedagogy of the imagination that is
rooted in the Spiritual Exercises. I have attempted to describe the sort
of authentic conversation that can be part of the law school culture as a
process of questioning and an exchange of convictions through which
we encounter, explore, and imagine possibilities, difference, and
otherness. By introducing us to such a process of conversation, law
school can teach us to engage in a new form of questioning that allows
us to approach legal problems with a reconstructive and critical
imagination.
This sort of school of the imagination is also central to the Spiritual
Exercises. Ignatius repeatedly directs the retreatant to put himself or
herself into the proper disposition for prayer through the use of
imagination.'76 For example, the First Prelude to the Contemplation of
the Kingdom of Jesus Christ is "[a] composition by imagining the
place. Here it will be to see with the eyes of the imagination the
synagogues, villages, and castles through which Christ our Lord
passed as he preached."'' 77 Similarly, Ignatius consistently invites the
retreatant to enter imaginatively into the concrete details of the scene
that is the subject of a given contemplation.
These techniques grow out of the Ignatian insight that "God uses the
gospel stories to draw us imaginatively into their world in order to
reveal himself to us. . . . Ignatius expects that God will fulfill the
desires of the retreatant to get to know Jesus more intimately through
the use of his or her imagination."'7 18 Such techniques of imaginative
prayer are so central to the Spiritual Exercises that they have been
175. See GRANFIELD, supra note 5, at 243.
[B]eyond [the] narrow categories [of legal positivism] there exists a richer
world of meaning and value, open to the mind that questions honestly ...
Proper inquiry, reflection, and deliberation can bring us into contact with a
larger reality. Transcending the self-imposed limitations of legal positivism
and radical historicism, we can ask questions with the reasonable expectation
of achieving deeper understanding. This expectation, even in the field of law,
raises the God question.
Id..
176. See infra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
177. GANSS, supra note 167, at 53, 155 (footnote omitted) (noting that this sort of
imaginative composition occurs 13 times in the Exercises).
178. WILLIAM A. BARRY, S.J., ALLOWING THE CREATOR TO DEAL WITH THE CREATURE:
AN APPROACH TO THE SPIRITUAL EXERCISES OF IGNATIUS OF LOYOLA 65-67 (1994).
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described as a form of decision-oriented mysticism rooted in the act of
imagining. 179
The Jesuit tradition of education reflects this decision-making
pedagogy of the imagination that flows from the experience of the
Exercises. James P. Walsh, S.J., for example, has described Jesuit
education as a matter of liberating students by inviting them out of
themselves and into the concrete experiences of another; Jesuit
education, at its best, forms students who are able to engage in a
creative re-imagining of their experiences and the world in which they
live and act:
Education is a matter of imagination, not the mastery of facts. It
consists precisely of being led beyond where we would be
comfortable and, as the first moment in that process, noticing
and facing honestly our resistances to what is new and strange
and alien. It brings us out of ourselves into the experience of
the other.
Education can be seen as the process by which we can be made
aware of the ways in which we imagine the world and the ways
we act out that sense of reality; it is the process by which we are
invited into new worlds, the world of others in their otherness, in
the concreteness of their diverse experience, and so re-imagine
our own lives. It is the process by which we are
freed to go out
80
of ourselves and live with others in friendship.'
Through an application of the case method that is open to the
demands of authentic conversation, the law school experience can
18
foster the development of this sort of moral imagination.
Accordingly, as part of the Society's commitment to develop a culture
of dialogue, and given their roots in the educational traditions of the
Society, law schools operating within the context of Jesuit universities
are ideally situated to begin the process of re-imagining the law school
as a culture of dialogue fostering conversion to the demands of
authentic conversation.

179. See ANTONIO T. DE NICOLAS, POWERS OF IMAGINING, IGNATIUS DE LOYOLA: A
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTIC OF IMAGINING THROUGH THE COLLECTED WORKS OF IGNATIUS
DE LOYOLA 28-29, 94 (1986).
180. James P. Walsh, S.J, Imagining: A Way of Life, in JESUIT EDUCATION AND THE
CULTIVATION OF VIRTUE 27-28 (William J. O'Brien ed., 1990).

181. See also KRONMAN, supra note 27, at 113 (describing the case method "as a
forcing ground for the moral imagination").
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VIi. CONCLUSION
Bernard Lonergan's analysis of the constitutive function of
meaning, the operation of practical common sense, and conversion as
movement toward a new horizon as a result of detachment from bias,
along with White's conception of the law as an activity of constitutive
rhetoric within a culture of argument and conversation, suggest that
law school can be understood as a process of "re-horizoning" for
greater fidelity to the unrestricted desire to know. To the extent that a
law school constitutes itself as a community in which authentic
conversation about the law is encouraged and in which the skills
necessary for such conversation are modelled and taught, the law
school can serve as a community which fosters the development of a
culture of argument.
Through the dialectical process and
conversational questioning that are part of this culture, the law school
can be an effective component of a cosmopolis of legal culture with the
potential to combat the problems of general bias inherent in the law as
a species of practical common sense. Finally, by striving for greater
fidelity to unfettered operation of the fundamental human desire to
know, the understanding of legal education I have tried to articulate
might make it increasingly possible for law schools to train students to
"think like lawyers" without sacrificing the students' fundamentally
human desires to think and act like persons searching for meaning and
value in fully integrated lives.

